"That's not how wars are fought": An Atlantic Council analyst criticized the West for its ineffective policy of weapon restrictions on Ukraine.

Previously, the United States succeeded in curbing Russian military expansion globally. Putin respected America. However, since 2008 (when Barack Obama became President of the United States), Putin's attitude towards Western countries has "bordered on contempt." During Joe Biden's presidency, we witnessed numerous failures in the U.S. containment strategy. This is why the Russians invaded Ukraine.

This perspective was shared by Andrew Mihta, Director of the Scowcroft Strategic Initiative and Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, whose analysis was translated and prepared by Radio Liberty. Here are the key points made by the scholar regarding Ukraine.

Previously, the U.S. adversaries were not so brazen and did not take such risks, fearing a decisive response. However, since 2008, Putin's behavior has bordered on contempt – he simply does what he wants and gets what he wants.

The West continues its failed policy of "appeasement," because even while sending weapons to the Ukrainians, it constantly talks about "managing escalation," about "limits," out of fear of taking risks.

This is not how wars are fought. We are limiting the plans and goals of the Ukrainians, while the other side is destroying them without paying a price for it.

There is something strange in the West's approach to various types of conflicts, as if it is still clinging to a world that no longer exists. It tries to recreate this world, to negotiate some agreement to bring about calm.

Unfortunately, for the opponents, this is merely a signal to advance further.

Containment crumbles when appeasement becomes a dominant element in international relations. Containment can only regain its influence in the context of acute conflict.

We have embarked on a path where the cost of restoring containment may be much higher than it would have been if we had truly responded decisively at the very beginning, in 2008 in Georgia.

The response was a slap from Putin and the continuation of the construction of the "Nord Stream – 1." Then came Ukraine in 2014, and again the construction of "Nord Stream – 2."

Thus, from the Russian perspective, the West is simply soft, allowing Putin to act with impunity.

Each time, the West has been obsessively concerned with "managing escalation." And Putin understood this and exploited it well, raising the level of his threats to the point of nuclear war. This effectively paralyzed decision-making processes in the U.S. administration.

Currently, there is no discussion in Washington about the so-called final state of Russia; everyone is focused on the final state of Ukraine – what the Ukrainian state should look like after the war, whether it will be in the orbit of the West, whether it will be controlled by the Russians, what these concessions will be, etc.

But the main question is the security of Europe and how the situation in Russia will develop further, and for some reason, we are not talking about this.

There is no sensible conversation about how to achieve changes "in Tsarist Russia," and how crucial Ukraine is to these changes.

A lot will depend on how Putin reacts to Donald Trump's (peaceful – ed.) proposal. If he simply rejects it, it could lead to a very sharp reaction from the U.S. President.

For instance, Trump might say: fine, let’s give them resources, unshackle the Ukrainians, set them a deadline for how many months they need to reach a level where these negotiations can take place.

The key issue here is the willingness to take risks. Both in Europe and the U.S.

However, regarding Europe, apart from the countries geographically closest to Ukraine, I do not see this willingness. Neither Germany nor France is willing to take the risk of escalation. The same can be said for the Biden administration, unfortunately.

Due to constant fear and questions like whether to provide Ukraine with HIMARS, the Russians have been given a gift of 500 days, during which they dug trenches, mined territories, and destroyed part of the Ukrainian army that we (NATO – ed.) had been training since 2015.

If the strategy does not change, Ukraine will simply be left without people: in terms of population, Russia currently has an advantage over Ukraine of about four to one.

We must not shy away from answering what Ukraine's victory should look like.

This should be a serious conversation among the United States, Europe, and Ukraine about where we are all heading. Having decided what the final state should be, we need to provide the Ukrainians with what they need to achieve it.

Because if we continue to operate under the principle of "as long as it takes," the country will bleed and ultimately disintegrate. This is not how military strategy is constructed.

Ukraine is, in fact, the best member of the North Atlantic Alliance, without being a member of the alliance. It has the largest and best-trained army in Europe, emphasizes Andrew Mihta.

As the world around Europe becomes increasingly dangerous, the world around the United States is also becoming more perilous – in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

"There is hope that in 2025, true leaders will emerge in the West – people who will openly tell citizens how dangerous the situation is, and here I primarily criticize the largest European countries. I am talking about the lack of leadership in Germany, the lack of leadership in France, a sort of limping in Great Britain, and these huge political divisions, these internal wars that I see in Poland. I hope that Donald Trump will prove to be such a leader," notes the analyst.

We are at the zero stage of the war against the established axis of dictatorships (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea). These countries are already mobilizing, increasing arms production, and building military potential. Meanwhile, we are still talking about strategic competition.

These prolonged internal debates in the U.S. are unnecessary – what is more important, Europe or Asia, the Atlantic or the Indo-Pacific region? And this is when North Korean soldiers are already in Europe. The division of these theaters is absurd, as our adversary has already determined what it will look like without us. The security of the U.S. depends on all theaters.

Therefore, in Europe and Ukraine, we must think about the true geopolitical interests of the U.S., because, although we are all in the same boat, the U.S. remains the main guarantor of the security of global democracy, asserts the analyst.

Background. Recall that the Washington Post reported how Sullivan in 2022 persuaded India and China to "save the world" from the Russian nuclear threat. Sullivan's strategy contained a paradox: Washington wanted Russia's defeat at the hands of Ukraine, but not one that would provoke a nuclear conflict.