The Russian army poses a threat... to Russia itself.

Since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, debates have persisted regarding whether a full-scale war combined with Western sanctions could lead to internal unrest in Russia and ultimately its downfall. Despite numerous defeats and, at best, superficial successes on the battlefield, the Russian Federation has demonstrated its resilience and determination to wage a prolonged war. However, the longer the conflict continues, the more the Russian armed forces degrade at various levels. Even worse for Moscow, Ukrainians have shifted part of the burden of the conflict onto the aggressor's territory. This adds further complications for the Kremlin, which, when coupled with other issues, could affect the future course of the war.

The first year of the invasion in Ukraine has come at a high cost to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. They have suffered serious losses among the most trained personnel, who bore the brunt of the combat operations. In terms of equipment, there has been a degradation of the ground forces' technology. A significant number of relatively modern or new vehicles, artillery howitzers, air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment, and trucks have been lost. The most painful loss for the Black Sea Fleet was the flagship cruiser "Moscow," which was sunk by Ukrainian forces in the spring of 2022. The Russian Air Force has also sustained significant losses, although Russia still possesses a large number of aircraft and helicopters. However, with each passing year of the war, the situation regarding equipment worsens.

Today, the tactics of the invading troops have become increasingly hasty, reflected in the Russian strategy of throwing more infantry brigades into battle as "cannon fodder." The ratio of vehicles (whether old or new models) to the total number of ground forces is steadily decreasing, affecting their effectiveness and ability to achieve success on an operational scale.

Although the number of Russian armed forces is increasing, they are becoming increasingly poorly trained, and their morale is primarily based on financial incentives. So-called "contract soldiers" are sent to the front, but it is essential to remember that these are often young individuals who signed contracts with the military shortly after beginning their mandatory service, rather than professional, trained soldiers as one might assume from the name. In most cases, it takes very little time before these "contract soldiers" are sent to the "special military operation" merely as "cannon fodder." Due to the significant personnel losses in the Russian army, both young and experienced professional officers have decreased in number.

In many respects, the Russian armed forces are regressing to the infamous 1990s. The army is less prepared, less equipped, its motivation is declining, and corruption is not diminishing but rather increasing. Internal problems and conflicts within Russia are also on the rise. The rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the terrorist act in Crocus City, abuses by supporters of Ramzan Kadyrov, and the related conflict surrounding Wildberries, as well as growing poverty, all indicate that the Russian Federation as a state is gradually regressing to the first decade of its existence. The Kremlin certainly takes this relatively new historical analogy into account, as well as more distant times of imperial crises. Concerns about a repeat of the events of 1917, when the military played a decisive role in the overthrow of the tsar and Russia's exit from World War I, are often voiced in Russian media. Such fears have been expressed repeatedly, for example, by Igor Strelkov-Girkin, a Russian nationalist and former intelligence officer who was imprisoned for criticizing the Kremlin's policies and the tactics of conducting the "special military operation."

Could the army pose a threat?

It is no coincidence that Russian memory returns to the revolutionary period. In 1917, a number of factors played a role, some of which are repeating now. After less than three years of exhausting World War I, the Russian army was very different from the one with which the Romanov Empire began its involvement in the global conflict. Many experienced officers loyal to the monarchy had fallen, and among those who survived, including new wartime commanders—namely, advanced non-commissioned officers and civilians, often critical of the ruler and his policies—there were many disillusioned with the situation at home. Many soldiers from rear garrisons had no intention of going to the front, and the fighting spirit of the troops was declining. Nicholas II and the command could rely only on a few motivated units. The economic situation in the empire was dire, and industry and allied supplies could not meet the needs of the front. Additionally, in times of crisis, the independence tendencies of some of the peoples oppressed by Russia were becoming evident. Ultimately, the modern Russian army is experiencing similar issues. Not only is the quality of equipment declining, but the size of the army is also decreasing, with significantly fewer soldiers in units than required. After February 24, 2022, many experienced soldiers, including officers, were killed or seriously wounded. New recruits, lacking sufficient preparation for modern warfare, are replacing veterans from Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and the initial battles in Ukraine. Interethnic problems are escalating, and morale is gradually declining.

Involvement in the war in Ukraine primarily motivates Russians by financial factors rather than by patriotism or a sense of duty to the state or family. The effectiveness of propaganda about bloodthirsty "Ukrainians" is also declining. In June 2024, some governors even offered volunteers the equivalent of $20,000 as a one-time payment for simply signing a contract with the Armed Forces of Russia. On October 11, the governor of the Belgorod region was already offering over 3 million rubles, equivalent to approximately $31,000. It should be noted that the need to increase one-time payments for those willing to go to war may ultimately negatively impact the finances of the Russian Federation.

Returning soldiers from the war are becoming a serious problem in Russia. They are often aggressive, abuse alcohol and drugs, and commit robberies. At the end of September this year, the Russian portal "Verstka" reported that since the beginning of the "special military operation," veterans of the "SMO" had committed 242 murders and also injured 227 citizens of the Russian Federation. Many Russians are concerned about criminals who were amnestied after signing contracts with the so-called "Wagner Group" and the Ministry of Defense of Russia. This has allowed particularly dangerous criminals to be released. Some of them have returned to a life of crime. Based on data from initiated cases, "Verstka" concluded that out of 426 veterans who committed crimes against the civilian population of Russia, 246 were criminals amnestied for participating in the invasion. The rest were regular servicemen, which can also be seen as a troubling sign. Russian journalists have discovered that general jurisdiction courts do not publish data on all convictions and sometimes also avoid providing information about whether the convicted individual is a serviceman or a veteran who was subject to amnesty.

On the other hand, former servicemen face misunderstanding from the civilian population. This applies not only to soldiers with PTSD but also to many disabled individuals. The state and society treat them as a fifth wheel, and their needs are ignored. The indifference of state institutions and civilians to the fate of permanently disabled soldiers undoubtedly does not positively impact the morale of soldiers in uniform.

Acts of violence against veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war are also occurring. On October 16, a 44-year-old Nikita Klenkov, deputy commander of one of the units, was shot near Moscow. His car came under fire from another vehicle. The attack resembles mafia-style reckoning. It cannot be ruled out that a significant number of former and current Russian officers are already involved in criminal activities, the number of which is difficult to determine.

Russian servicemen are also concerned about incidents of ethnic conflicts. Some representatives of minorities believe that their compatriots are exploited more in the war than ethnic Russians. In August, Vyacheslav Dondokov, a deputy from Buryatia and a politician from the pro-Kremlin "United Russia," held a conference where he raised the issue of soldier casualties from his region based on data from a field hospital in the Zaporizhzhia region, where he served before starting his political career. According to Dondokov, losses among Buryats were disproportionately higher than among soldiers from ethnically Russian territories. A month later, it became known that he had signed another contract and would likely participate in the "SMO" again. Social media speculates that the reason was either raising the issue of disproportionately high Buryat losses or a financial-criminal conflict with another local Buryat politician, Anatoly Dimchikov.

Disputes between Kadyrovites and servicemen of Russian nationality are also quite frequent. Since the beginning of the invasion, there have been reports of persecution of the latter by Chechens supporting Ramzan Kadyrov. Beatings and humiliation of young Russians, sometimes recorded on smartphones, have become the norm. Complaints about thefts and even homosexual rapes have also surfaced on social media. There are plenty of Russians who are increasingly outraged by the lawlessness and imp