Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister and a great friend of Ukraine, Gabrielius Landsbergis, who is currently writing a book about Russia's war against Ukraine, shared in an interview with the Italian publication Linkiesta why he believes it is a bad idea to push Ukraine towards negotiations with Russia and how to create conditions for Putin to want to engage in peace talks himself.
Key points from the interview.
On the policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor prevalent among Western European countries
There are several reasons for this. Many people are convinced that, apart from Putin's regime, there is Russian culture, and that we need to maintain ties with this part of the country. Additionally, there are economic reasons, so to speak, pragmatic ones, including the corruption of some officials, which poses a danger. We are experiencing the largest geopolitical crisis on the continent since World War II, and we know that Russia has no intention of stopping at Ukraine. However, this message, which seems obvious to Ukrainians and the Baltic states, becomes increasingly blurred as it moves further west and south.
On how to counter Russian propaganda in the West
In Eastern Europe, there is a different sense of danger. Our history has taught us this, and our geography reminds us of it every day. We Lithuanians lived under pressure from Russia for decades after we regained our independence. Moscow has always interfered in our elections. And when such things started happening in France and other countries, we already have 20 years of experience in this matter: it means our institutions are prepared to counter the Russian threat. That’s why we can explain to Western Europe how this works.
On the 1938 scenario for Ukraine
For the past three years, we have felt as though we are living in one of those eras where history is being written, and something significant happens almost every day. Everything could unfold according to the worst-case scenario, where Ukraine becomes exhausted, Russia gains success on the battlefield, and the West can pressure Kyiv into negotiations against its interests. Simply put, look at Czechoslovakia in 1938, and you will see exactly the same situation.
On the possibility of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in the near future
If the situation remains as it is now, there is no question: negotiations at this point would be capitulation and betrayal of Ukraine. The only way out is to ask ourselves if we can create conditions where Russia would want to negotiate after realizing it cannot win. We need Moscow to ponder: “Russia needs negotiations because our economy is weak, European support for Ukraine is too strong, and we are about to lose the war, so it’s better to negotiate.” But to bring Russia to this conclusion, we need to provide tremendous support to Ukraine, much greater than we have offered thus far.
On a ceasefire
We need very clear security guarantees for Ukraine. History helps us here. If we establish a ceasefire now, Putin simply will not respect it, as has been the case in the past: you don’t need a PhD in history to read the (Minsk) agreements from 2014 and see how Ukraine was forced into negotiations. But what did that peace lead to? To nothing, just a new war. Why should we expect different outcomes this time?
On European unity in confronting Russia
First of all, everything must start with Ukraine. Our security is inseparable from Ukraine's security. If Kyiv is not safe, then Europe is not safe. We must revive the spirit we saw in our common struggle against the pandemic. Back in 2020, all of Europe united; we changed economic rules, and we managed to allocate 750 billion euros to help countries overcome the problems brought by COVID. We did this because it was a crisis situation. Now, with war looming, we must first agree that we are all in yet another crisis situation.
On what will change with Trump's arrival for Ukraine and the West
We must ask ourselves what crisis we need to truly wake up. Do we need an even greater war, a war that tests NATO's integrity? Trump's election should signal significant changes on the defense front. Some countries that are already preparing to cooperate with the new U.S. administration are thinking about how to find common ground and some unity of goals where possible. However, I'm not entirely convinced that this (Trump's arrival) will be a wake-up call.
On the weakness of democracy in the face of autocracy
At some point, we became accustomed to the notion that we are too weak to confront a more aggressive regime. But in reality, that is not the case. Democratic systems are states that have money, the capacity for innovation, knowledge, international agreements for protection, legal systems that are healthier than others, and governments based on citizen trust. However, over the past three years, we have allowed ourselves to be convinced by Putin's narrative that Ukraine is destined to capitulate, the West is divided, and NATO does not exist. And it is not because Putin is so strong, but because we see ourselves as weak. If we keep convincing ourselves of this – then yes, autocracies can prevail. But I am absolutely confident that we can change this.
On Lithuania's and Ukraine's relations
The empathy we feel for Ukrainians is rarely found elsewhere in the world. I can say that the Ukrainian heart beats in Lithuania: if Ukrainians are sad, Lithuanians are sad; if Ukrainians are happy, Lithuanians are happy. I know this may seem strange, but it is indeed the case in our country.
On future plans
I am working on a book – a diary that I have kept since the beginning of the war. And, as a former minister of a frontline country, I believe there are several interesting ideas here. I feel the need to continue talking about what I think is important and want to remain active on the international political stage as an independent voice. Because in all this background noise, those who fight for freedom and democracy need help. And if I can assist them in this, I will continue to do so.